University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2011

Two Cheers, Not Three for Sixth Amendment Originalism
Stephanos Bibas
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons,
Criminology Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and
Society Commons, Legal Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Repository Citation
Bibas, Stephanos, "Two Cheers, Not Three for Sixth Amendment Originalism" (2011). Faculty Scholarship
at Penn Law. 918.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/918

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law:
Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

TWO CHEERS, NOT THREE, FOR SIXTH AMENDMENT
0RIGINALISM
STEPHANOS BTBAS.

This Essay makes three basic points.1 First, originalism is a
good approach where the soil supports it, but many criminal
procedure cases, particularly recent cases before the Supreme
Court, lack solid historical foundations. 2 The Court is trying to
build too much of an edifice on quicksand. It is going to sink.
Second, defense lawyers should be careful what they wish
for. Though many defense lawyers cheer certain originalist decisions, they would not like the whole package that would result from applying a consistent originalist philosophy. Justice
Thomas might be willing to give us such a package? but it does
not appear, on balance, more favorable to defendants than our
current system.
Third, although Professor Jeffrey Fisher rightly touches on
the idea of bright-line rules, 4 there are a number of areas where
originalism leads away from bright-line rules. Justice Scalia
likes originalism; he also likes formalism. 5 In some cases, how*Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Professor Jeff Fisher for a lively and illuminating debate and for his comments.
l. This Symposium Essay expands upon and extends themes that I originally explored in Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183
(2005).
2. Apprendi v. New }erset;, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is one example. For my earlier critique of its historical moorings see Stephanos Bibas, judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1123-32 (2001). Professor
Jeffrey Fisher, overconfident about Apprendi's originalist footing, disagrees. See
Jeffery L. Fisher, Originalism as an Anchor for the Sixth Amendment, 34 HARV. ).L. &
PUB. POL'Y 53, 56-57 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499-523 (Thomas, J., concurring).
4. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 56-58.
5. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Symposium Essays on Originalism-Foreword, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 871, 873 (2008) (discussing the future success of originalism and
expressing hope that "the truth wiU prevail"); Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
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ever, a judge must choose between the two. Sometimes
originalism contradicts doctrines such as the exclusionary rule 6
even though, intuitively, modern formalists should embrace
the exclusionary rule because it is clear, simple, and instructs
police exactly what not to do. 7

1.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND }URY CONTROL OF SENTENCING

First, let us focus on the jury trial and sentencing cases. The
ground here is soft enough to be a quagmire. The text of the
Sixth Amendment does not define a trial or a criminal proseetttion.8 Does it therefore include sentencing?
Eighteenth-century trials contained no sentencing phase.9 There
is some evidence that juries knew of the punishments for
crimes-more so in England than America-but there was nothing like modern sentencing proceedings. 10 Professor Fisher concedes that many of the contentious issues in criminal litigation
today, such as sentencing guidelines, lack solid historical foundations for originalist anal ysis.11
To return to trials as conducted in the colonial era, we would
have to give juries the power to sentence openly. We would give
Law of Rules, 56 U. CI-U. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (arguing that bright-line mles are
preferable to discretionary standards).
6. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
786 (1994) ("Supporters of the excl usionary mle cannot point to a single major statement from the Founding ... supporting Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence
in a criminal trial. ... [E]xclusion was so implausible that .... in the rare case in
which the argument ... was made, it received the back of the judicial hand."); Patrick Tinsley et al., In Defense of Evidence m1d Against the Exclusionary Rule: A Libertarian Approach, 32 S.U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2004) ("[F}or one hundred years after the passage
of the Fourth Amendment, evidence of a defendant's guilt was never excluded just
because it was obtained illegally.").
7. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary
mle-which prevents the prosecution from admitting evidence at trial which was
unconstitutionally acquired-applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ....").
9. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-81 (2000). Instead, juries would
make a finding of guilt, and then a judge would ordinarily impose a sentence fixed
by statute. /d. Judicial discretion in sentencing, when allowed, was restricted to "imposing [a] sentence within statutory limits." /d. at 481 (emphasis in original).
10. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 1124-25 n.204.
11. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 56.
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judges a free hand in commenting on evidence and expressing
their views about a defendant's guilt.12 We would run criminal
cases in an hour or less. Few, if any, defense lawyers would support these results.
Although the Apprendi line of cases advocates rules to constrain
judges, a return to the eighteenth century would mean getting rid
of jury instructions, in which judges define mens rea for the jury.
Absent judicial instruction on mens rea, juries would just decide
whether a defendant was bad or wicked,13 which is probably not a
very pro-defendant approach. I m ight be comfortable with it, but
many of the newfound friends of originalism would not.
Would we abolish or loosen the rules of evidence? Would we
let in past criminal records? During the colonial era, jurors
could tell if a defendant had a prior felony conviction. A felon
was branded on the thumb, so a jury readily knew whether the
defendant was a bad person who did not deserve leniency. 14
Today, the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude most previous
convictions and other bad acts from evidence. 15 Yet prodefendant advocates want to have the icing of the originalism
cake-that is, those parts that are good for defendants-while
avoiding the other, less tasty parts that cut against their clients.
Likewise, simplifying jury instructions gives judges a much
freer hand to voice their own views. Professor Fisher writes
that one of the themes here is curbing the power of judges. 16
During the eighteenth century, however, judges had great latitude to comment on the evidence, to make their views known,
and even to lean on juries, short of throwing them in prison.17
Judges could suggest strongly to juries that there was only one
12. See infra notes 17-18.
13. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the /~ole of
Motive in the Criminal Lnw Pnst nnd Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635,663 (1993).
14. See STUART BANNER, TH E DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 64 (2002);
see nlso HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT: A RECORD OF MAN'S
INHUMANITY TO MAN 62 (1930); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND P UNISHMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1993).
15. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 609.
16. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 55, 57.
17. See, e.g., j EROM E FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 112 (1949); FRIEDMAN, suprn note 14, at 245-46; BARBARA J. SHAPfRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW OF EVTDENCE 268-69 n.94 (1991).

48

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 34

way to read the evidence. 18 Judges were not as timid then as
they are today; the risk of reversal on appeal or habeas was
mostly absent. 19 Furthermore, sentences were carried out immediately. In practice, judges had more authority in many ways.
Professor Fisher replies that we can secure the prodefendant benefits of jury findings of certain facts without
opening up the legal definition of mens rea, the admissibility
of criminal records, and the like. One cannot, however, so easily separate these benefits from admitting evidence that is
currently excluded. Professor Fisher theorizes that the jury is
not there just to find facts, but more importantly to express
the conscience of the community and to render full moral
judgment about what a particular defendant deserves. 2o Such
a full moral judgment requires the jury to see both sides of the
picture at sentencing. It requires the prior criminal record.
Giving the jury the power to make moral judgments is inconsistent with putting a thumb on the scale and keeping the jury
from hearing evidence necessary for the full, balanced picture.
Finally, if we are going to be consistently originalist, we
would need to make many more reforms as well. We would
have to follow Justice Thomas's approach to its logical conclusion and abolish the exclusionary rules, thus sacrificing formalism for originalism.21 We wou ld also abolish plea-bargaining.22
We would then have twenty-five times more trials 23 -an enormous practical problem. No one except Justice Thomas, and
probably not even he, is willing to go that far.

18. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 17 (2000) (noting an instance in 1741 where a judge instructed
the jury that "the evidence from the prosecution's witnesses seemed 'so ample, so
full, so dear and satisfactory' that [the jury) should convict the prisoner ' if [the jurors] have no particular reasons ... to discredit them"').
19. See Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61
HARv. L. REV. 657, 658 (1948) (describing the limited role of federal habeas corpus in
the eighteenth century).
20. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 55.
21. See Amar, supra note 6, at 786; Tinsley eta!., supra note 6, at 65.
22. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 196-97 (arguing that plea bargaining subverts an
unwaivable constitutional mandate of a jury trial in all criminal cases).
23. See id. at 197 ("U]ury trials resolve fewer than four percent of criminal cases."
(citing BUREAU OF }USTlCESTATISTICS, U.S. DEr'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMJNAL JUSTICESTATISTICS 2003, at tbls.5.17, 5.46)).

No.1)

Sixth Amendment Originalism

49

On the Court, we currently have an odd situation where
originalist criminal procedure cases flow from coalitions comprising the two committed originalists and several other, £air-weather
originalist Justices. These latter Justices, however, are really motivated by an individual fairness interpretation that is more at
home in the Due Process Clause.24 The coalition fractures when
the due process Justices will not consistently go as far as the diehard originalists.25 Bizarre cases result in which the Court will not
follow a principle consistently. The Court will only go so far, but
not far enough to prevent circumvention by plea-bargain.
For example, the Supreme Court found a way to uphold the
federal sentencing gu idelines in United States v. Booker26 because
Justice Breyer is committed to them - he was their archHect27 and because he managed to convince Justice Ginsburg that the
Gu idelines are fair enough.28 A few months earlier, however,
the Court struck down state sentencing guidelines29 that were
widely recognized as being fair to defendants, less constricting,
and giving less power to judges to augment sentences w ith
relevant conduct.30 When there is no consistent coali tion of five
originalists on the Supreme Court, we get a hash from the
Court. Sometimes the Court gets involved selectively, but the

24. U.S. CONSf. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ...."); see also U.S. CONSf. amend. XIV, § 1
("!N ]or shaU any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....").
25. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (upholding appellate review of
the substantive reasonableness of sentences against a Sixth Amendment challenge);
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007) (same). Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in Gall casting doubt on the compatibility of substantive reasonableness
review and the Sixth Amendment. Gall, 552 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. 543 U.S. 220, 264-65 (2005) (Breyer, j., remedial majority opinion).
27. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court ltns Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 392 (2010);
Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How fo Make fire Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENY. U. L.
REV. 63, 66-67 (2007).
28. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (Breyer, j., remedial majority opinion) (noting that
after the excision of its unconstitutional provisions, the Sentencing Guidelines still
retained components through which it could accomplish its numerous objectives,
including sentencing fairness).
29. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305, 313-14 (2004).
30. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentenci11g Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Polietj Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1192 (2005).
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nonoriginalist Justices will not agree to a coherent package of
rules that would prevent circumvention.
II.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Regarding the domain of the Confrontation Clause,31 I partially agree with Professor Fisher. We should follow historical
precedents when the clear, central cases they were designed to
deal with are at issue. Cases equivalent to the Sir Walter Raleigh triaV2 where the government tries to railroad a defendant-especially a political defendant-and to circumvent proof
in open court, are prime examples of cases against which the
Confrontation Clause was historically designed to protect.33
The prosecution should not be able to hide behind depositions
or ex parte interviews by state officials.
This historical evidence, however, takes us only so far. How
about 911 calls?34 These calls did not exist in the Framing era. We
can extrapolate some general ideas about 911 calls, but we have
to make it up with, at best, some general guidance or principles.35 No obvious bright-line rule emerges here.36 How about
the gentle questioning of a rape victim by a battered-women's
advocate? Is that the same kind of "testimonial" evidence that
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....").
32. See THETRIALOF SIR WALTER RALEIGH, KNT. AT WINCHESTER, FOR HIGH TREASON (1603), reprinted in 2 COBBETI'S COMPLETE COLLECflON OF STATE TRIALS 1, 1-60
(T.B. Howell ed., 1809).
33. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004) ("[T]he principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused. It was these practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases
like Raleigh's ....").
34. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826-29 (2006), the Court held that a 911
call was nontestimonial because its principal purpose was to secure aid, and so admitting the call's contents into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
35. See id. at 822 (relying on whether a police officer's primary purpose during an
interrogation was to respond to an emergency or to genera te information that may
be used in a criminal prosecution as the dispositive factor in deciding whether the
statements generated by the interrogation were testimonial).
36. Cf David A. Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 40 ("In many
ways, the Line between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay remains indistinct
but the Court has made reasonably clear that certain kinds of hearsay-casual remarks among friends, for example-are nontestimonial and therefore raise no constitutional problems ....").
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the Framers dreaded? Not really. Ultimately, we might be able
to extend some of the historical principles a little bit, but we
have to be very cautious because today's issues do not involve
the same set of considerations that concerned the Framers.
Also worth noting is that the rules of evidence and the way
the courts approached confrontation were in flux in the eighteenth century.37 Professor Fisher's approach, which he persuaded the Court to adopt in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,38
thus freezes in place a snapshot of law that was changing in the
late eighteenth century.
In some types of cases, Professor Fisher has a point. For example, we have had some scandals in America in which lab examiners have faked forensic tests. 39 Even though it is possible to rerun
many of these tests, bright-line application of the Confrontation
Clause provides another solution. The functionalist argument in
this case confirms for us that the formalist or originalist reading is
not ridiculous or disastrous. So formalism, functionalism, and
originalism work together here.
Consider, however, a different example: coroners' autopsies
and inquests. In a drug case, lab examiners usually perform tests
and then testify within a year after the drug test was completed.
Because murder does not have a statute of limitations, however,
it may be ten or twenty years until an accused murderer is
tried - long after the victim's autopsy was performed. By the
time of trial, the coroner may be dead or otherwise unavailable.
Even if the coroner is available, what is he going to do? Does the
coroner have an independent memory of one specific autopsy
out of the thousand he has done over the last ten or twenty years?
No. At trial, he would just read his years-old autopsy report under the evidentiary fiction of present recollection refreshed.40
I

37. See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modem Evide11ce Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 502-04,
533-39 (1999); Sklansky, suprn note 36, at 41-42.
38. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (holding that the Confrontation Clause bars admitting into evidence a lab examiner's report unless the prosecution makes the declarant available for cross-examination).
39. See, e.g., A Year of Scandals with Forensic Evidence, WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at
AS; Eric Lichtblau, Scie111ist Falsified DNA Reports, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at A21;
Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to
Scrutiny Seen Across U. S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at Cl.
40. See FED. R. Evro. 612.
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When questioned about the autopsy, he would say, "yes, in fact, I
found this bullet three centimeters above the spleen."41
No solid historical evidence says that we must reach this result based on eighteenth-century precedent, and there are subs tantial policy and common sense reasons to believe that we
should not. There are good reasons to think that the Framers
would not have extended confrontation this fa r; they articulated a slogan about confrontation without fleshing out its
outer limits.u So we should be very careful, particularly about
turning confrontation into a bright-line rule where its boundaries traditionally have not been so clear.
Finally, originalism provides only a minimum, not a maximum.
The rules of criminal procedure take care of updating many other
safeguards to fit the modem landscape. If we want to look seriously at what it takes to confront complicated scientific and forensic evidence, the word in the Sixth Amendment is not crossexamine, it is "confront,"43 which may be broader. What does it
take to produce an effective cross-examination? Is support for forensic experts required? An originalist focus might distract from
serving those originalist values in more modem ways. 44
My bottom line is two cheers, not three, for originalism in
criminal procedure. Originalism works pretty well in core cases
like the Sir Walter Raleigh trial, but much of what we are litigating today is beyond those core cases, as Professor Fisher effectively concedes.45 There are real dangers in taking what was
an evolving rule and freez ing it into a bright-line slogan that
can be both over- and under-inclusive.

41 . Besides being largely unhelph1l, cross-examination of medical expe rts may be
unnecessa ry to avoid the miscarriages of justice against which the Confrontation
Clause was designed to protect. See Sklansky, supra note 36, at 45-46.
42. See id. at 35-37.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
44. See Sklansky, supra note 36, at 50-57.
45. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 56, 59.

